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In this paper, we examine how the geographic distance between a firm and its largest 
institutional investors affects the firm’s litigation risk. We show that geographic proximity 
between the firm and its largest institutional shareholders reduces the incidence of a lawsuit. 
Moreover, we find that geographic proximity affects the relationship between institutional 
investors’ ownership and the litigation risk of their portfolio firms. These findings indicate that 
geographically proximate investors may have an informational advantage over investors who are 
located far away, and that this advantage manifests itself in more effective monitoring of firm 
management, and consequently, in lower litigation risk.  
 
 
JEL classification: G23; G34; K41 

















 This paper addresses the question of whether the geographic proximity of the financial 
institution to its portfolio firm affects the litigation risk on the part of the firm. We study the 
effect of geography on litigation, while simultaneously capturing other core features of 
institutional investments such as ownership concentration and investment horizon. To the best of 
our knowledge, no previous study has tested the importance of physical distance between an 
institution and its portfolio firm in explaining litigation risk. 
The extant literature documents that corporate misconduct that leads to litigation causes 
significant and often irreparable damage to firm value as well as heavy losses to investors (e.g., 
DuCharme et al., 2004; Haslem, 2005; Karpoff et al., 2008; Gande and Lewis, 2009; Atanasov et 
al., 2012). Moreover, market penalties have been shown to be considerably more severe than the 
legal penalties imposed on a sued firm. For example, Karpoff et al. (2008) report that a sued firm 
tends to lose about 40% of its market capitalization upon the announcement of a lawsuit. The 
authors show that the reputational damage is about 7.5 times higher than the legal 
penalties/settlement paid by the firm.  
At the same time, the shareholder litigation literature shows that institutional investors, 
via their monitoring activities, can significantly affect a firm’s litigation risk (e.g., Talley, 2009; 
Cheng et al., 2010; Pukthuanthong et al., 2017). Institutional monitoring includes extracting and 
gathering information from and about a firm’s management, as well as persuading, influencing, 
and exerting pressure on the firm’s top decision-makers. In addition, the literature suggests that 
institutional monitoring is performed through private channels rather than through high-profile 
proxy voting (e.g., Carleton et al., 1998). The evidence indicates that private communications 
with a firm’s management lead to more effective monitoring. Exploring the impact of 















that ownership by institutional investors with long-term investment horizons tends to decrease a 
firm’s litigation risk, whereas short-term institutional ownership increases that risk. They argue 
that long-term investors have better knowledge of the firm’s projects and its management and are 
better able to forecast the firm’s future. In addition, institutions with large ownership stakes 
should benefit from economies of scale, which lower their cost of monitoring and allow them to 
take advantage of improved firm governance and better performance. Thus, while short-term 
investors tend to exit bad investments, long-term investors have a strong incentive and more 
leverage to monitor management and influence firm decisions. 
Arguably, the effectiveness of institutional control can be further increased through the 
geographic proximity of the institution to the firm. Prior research implies that geographic 
closeness facilitates formal and informal communication and collaboration. For example, Coval 
and Moskowitz (2001) show that institutional investors who are located close to their portfolio 
firms have a significant informational advantage over investors who are located far away. 
Geographic proximity enables institutions to gain access to private information and to obtain 
public information at a lower cost. Similarly, Ayers et al., (2011) demonstrate that close 
geographic proximity between a firm and a monitoring institution leads to more efficient 
information exchanges.  
 The above studies provide interesting insights that spur our investigation into whether 
geographically proximate institutions deter litigation through more effective monitoring. Since 
corporate misconduct that leads to litigation often causes considerable losses to investors 
(Karpoff et al., 2008), institutions that hold a large position in a firm or positions that are 
potentially difficult to liquidate may choose not to file a lawsuit against a firm’s unethical 















prefer to strengthen the monitoring intensity of their portfolio firms ex-ante and to monitor via 
other mechanisms such as private negotiations. All else equal, the outcomes of such private 
negotiations should depend on the geographic location of the institutions vis-à-vis the monitored 
firms. Therefore, institutions located in proximity to their monitored firms should be able to 
monitor more effectively than institutions domiciled in more remote locations. Consequently, we 
expect a positive association between the incidence of lawsuits and geographic distance between 
institutions and their portfolio firms.  
 Our findings are supportive of our predictions. We find that firms that are located in 
closer proximity to their investors have lower litigation risk. More specifically, we show that 
large institutional investors with close proximity to the firms’ headquarters diminish the 
probability of a lawsuit. Further, we find that investors’ geographic closeness to an investee firm 
affects the relationship between the investors’ ownership and the firm’s litigation risk. More 
specifically, for the largest long-term institutional investors we find that the closer the investors 
are located to the firm, the more their stock ownership decreases the firm’s litigation risk. The 
results for the largest short-term investors show that when the investors are geographically close 
to their investee firm, the positive effect of their ownership on the firm’s litigation risk is 
weaker.1 These findings imply that geographically proximate investors have an informational 
advantage over investors located far away. This advantage manifests itself in less costly and 
more effective monitoring and, as a consequence, a lower incidence of litigation against the firm. 
Our results are robust to potential endogeneity of the regressors in our empirical model. In 
addition, the findings continue to hold after taking into account different measurement 
methodologies and alternative econometric specifications.  
                                                          
1
 It is worth noting that even though the word “positive” normally implies “good,” in this case it has to be 
understood as “increasing the firm’s litigation risk” and thus as a bad effect for the firm. The opposite holds true for 















 Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it adds to the research on 
financial risk (e.g., Cheng et al., 2010; Atanasov et al., 2012; Hanley and Hoberg, 2012; Brochet 
and Srinivasan, 2014) by showing that a firm’s litigation risk is significantly lower if institutional 
investors with concentrated holdings are headquartered in proximity to the monitored firm. 
Second, it contributes to the body of work on the relevance of geography by providing evidence 
for an explicit link between the geographic proximity of institutional investors and firm behavior. 
In addition, we document important interaction effects suggesting that (1) geographic closeness 
strengthens the already negative effect of institutional ownership by long-term investors on an 
investee firm’s likelihood of being sued, and (2) investor-firm proximity weakens the positive 
relationship between short-term institutional ownership and portfolio-firm litigation risk. Finally, 
our study extends the literature that examines the specific channels through which institutional 
investors affect a firm’s internal control mechanisms.2 To the best of our knowledge, there is no 
study to date that has documented the importance of geographic proximity in determining a 
firm’s litigation risk. Our findings are not only important for academics, but also for practitioners 
and policy makers, as they highlight the role of institutional investors in closely monitoring their 
portfolio firms and in addressing potentially serious issues early on (i.e., before they become 
litigable). 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature 
and develop our hypotheses. In Section 3 we describe our data sources, sample construction, and 
the variables used in the empirical analysis. In Section 4 we outline the methodology. In Section 
5 we present the results, while in the following section we provide a series of robustness tests. 
We conclude in Section 7.  
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2. Related literature and hypotheses development 
 Our paper builds on several strands of the theoretical and empirical finance literature. 
First, extending research on financial risk, our work draws on several studies focusing on the risk 
associated with corporate litigation. Existing empirical research indicates that corporate 
misconduct frequently results in irreparable damages to shareholders. Losses can be enormous 
and include legal costs and penalties, settlement payments, significant business disruptions and, 
most importantly, reputation damages (e.g., DuCharme et al., 2004; Haslem, 2005; Karpoff et al., 
2008; Gande and Lewis, 2009; Atanasov et al., 2012). Studies by Bhagat et al., (1994), Bizjak 
and Coles (1995), and Bhagat et al., (1998) investigate the effect of inter-firm lawsuits on firm 
value. These studies report a significant decline in a firm’s stock price on the date of the lawsuit 
initiation. In a related paper, Karpoff et al. (2008) posit that the largest penalties on the firm are 
imposed by the markets rather than by legal authorities. Further, Gande and Lewis (2009) report 
a significant and negative effect of shareholder-initiated class action lawsuits on the sued firm’s 
stock price. In line with prior research, the authors report a significant and negative stock price 
reaction on the date of the lawsuit filing. Moreover, they show that in anticipation of a lawsuit, 
investors partially capitalize their losses, and that the negative effect of this capitalization on the 
firm’s stock price is considerably stronger than the effect observed on the filing date. Because 
litigation is so costly, it can be used as a disciplinary device by institutional investors (Cheng et 
al., 2010). On the other hand, for essentially the same reason, stakeholders may want to avoid 
litigation. Lowry and Shu (2002) argue that one way to reduce a firm’s likelihood of being sued 
is to impose more intense scrutiny over the firm’s activities.   
The second strand is concerned with incentives for large institutional shareholders to 















outside investors reduces agency costs and moral hazard problems. For example, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) argue that large investors have the right incentives to curb the tendency of a 
firm’s managers to undertake negative NPV projects, as they hold large enough stakes to absorb 
the costs of monitoring. Further, Noe (2002) and Edmans and Manso (2011) suggest that 
effective monitoring can be performed not only by a single large shareholder but by multiple 
large investors acting together. Moreover, their models predict that investors will intervene and 
interact directly with management to influence the decision-making process whenever there is a 
need for increased vigilance. Consistent with these theories, empirical research finds that 
institutional investors diminish managerial opportunism. For example, Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
show that the sensitivity of managerial pay to firm performance is significantly higher when the 
monitoring by institutions is more intensive. Chen et al., (2007) document that institutional 
investors influence management decisions to make higher quality takeovers, and Cheng et al. 
(2010) indicate that institutions improve board independence. Other studies on institutional 
intervention in corporate activity suggest that institutional monitoring is often performed through 
private channels rather than through high-profile proxy voting (e.g., Carleton et al., 1998), 
indicating that private communication with a firm’s management allows monitoring to be more 
effective. Simultaneously, a number of studies on shareholder litigation document that 
institutional investors influence firms’ litigation risk using various monitoring mechanisms (e.g., 
Talley, 2009; Cheng et al., 2010; Pukthuanthong et al., 2017). It has also been documented that 
the size of the investment stake and the investment horizon of the institution are significant 
determinants of the monitoring outcomes (e.g., Parrino et al., 2003; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 
2008; Pukthuanthong et al., 2017). These studies suggest that larger shareholders have better 















long- and short-term investors based on the expected investment horizons of their portfolio 
holdings. It has been argued that these two types of investors have different monitoring 
incentives (e.g., Gaspar et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007; Derrien et al., 2013). Long-term 
shareholders care about long-term value creation due to the fact that their holdings cannot be 
easily liquidated; therefore, they are more likely to perform viable monitoring of the firm’s 
activities. Short-term investors, on the other hand, tend to pursue quick profit opportunities due 
to the time-varying nature of their portfolio strategies and engage less in active oversight of the 
management. As a result, they are said to “vote with their feet” and sell their shares if they are 
unhappy with firm performance (Parrino et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2007). This heterogeneity in 
investor type has been shown in the literature to have implications for corporate behavior. For 
example, long-horizon shareholders tend to induce managers to engage in more profitable 
acquisitions (Chen et al., 2007) and to pursue higher investment rates, less debt financing, and 
lower payout ratios (Derrien et al., 2013), whereas short-term investors are associated with lower 
research and development expenditures (Bushee, 1998), significantly lower abnormal returns 
from mergers, higher long-run underperformance (Gaspar et al., 2005), and indifference to 
corporate social responsibility activities (Nguyen et al., 2018). In the context of litigation risk, 
Pukthuanthong et al. (2017) show that firms with greater ownership of long-term institutional 
investors have lower litigation risk, while firms with a greater representation of short-term 
institutional owners are at higher risk of being sued. 
Third, our study is related to the body of literature that investigates the relevance of 
geographic proximity between investors and their portfolio firms. For example, Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999, 2001) show that financial institutions preferentially hold positions in local 















institutions select nearby firms to benefit from the superior information obtained via closer 
monitoring and access to the same social circles. The authors argue that geographic proximity 
allows for better information exchanges during on-site visits and conversations with key staff, 
suppliers, and customers. More recently, Baik et al., (2010) found that geographic proximity 
facilitates the transfer of private information from the firm to its institutional investors. Their 
results suggest that the informational advantage is greater for institutions with larger ownership 
stakes in their portfolio firms, but does not vary with other institutional characteristics such as 
the institution’s investment horizon or trading style. A related body of work extends this 
literature and corroborates the above findings concerning the economic importance of proximity. 
For instance, Bodnaruk (2009) finds that individual investors prefer to invest in firms if they are 
in physical proximity to one of the firm’s offices or production facilities. Moreover, when 
investors relocate, they rebalance their portfolios by selling stocks of firms that have now 
become remote and by investing in firms that are closer to their new location. Bae et al., (2008) 
show that because of their proximity advantage, earnings forecasts of domestic analysts are more 
precise than forecasts produced by foreign analysts. Ayers et al. (2011) find that insiders are less 
likely to exercise discretion in financial reporting, if institutional investors are located in 
geographic proximity. Mazur and Salganik-Shoshan (2017) show that proximity among 
institutional investors has a positive impact on the efficiency of the corporate incentive system. 
Moreover, Giroud (2013) presents evidence that manufacturing plants that are located in 
geographic closeness to their headquarters, and are thus monitored more effectively, benefit from 
greater investment and higher productivity. 
Motivated by these three literature streams, our study aims to provide new and additional 















Specifically, we focus on the link between the geographical proximity of institutions to their 
portfolio firms and the probability of litigation against those firms. Our first hypothesis can be 
summarized as follows: physical proximity of institutional investors to a firm’s headquarters 
reduces the probability of litigation against that firm. This hypothesis is based on the evidence 
documented by the aforementioned literature, which suggests that geographic proximity of 
institutional investors to a firm facilitates the transfer and acquisition of both public and private 
information and thereby enables more efficient monitoring. Thus, nearby institutions, i.e., 
investors who have the actual ability as well as strong incentives to monitor, can be expected to 
be more capable of influencing the firm’s management to undertake value-enhancing ventures 
and to behave ethically, i.e., to avoid misconduct. We therefore formulate our first hypothesis as 
follows:  
Hypothesis 1: The geographic distance between a firm and its largest institutional 
investors increases the firm’s litigation risk. Thus, the larger the distance between the largest 
institutional investors and the firm, the higher the firm’s litigation risk. 
It is not clear from the literature whether the effect of geographic distance can be 
expected to differ for investors with long- and short-term investment horizons. To account for 
potential differences in the effect for long-term and short-term investors, we test the hypotheses 
for each investor type separately. The extant literature does not identify any reasons for the effect 
to be opposite for the two types of investor. Consequently, we expect Hypothesis 1 to be valid 
for both types of investor.  
Further, we focus on the potential mediating effect of the distance between a firm and its 
largest institutional investors on the previously documented impact of institutional stock 















proximity between institutional investors and a firm allows for less costly and more effective 
monitoring, which will correspondingly affect the relationship between institutional ownership 
and litigation risk. In particular, given the differential effect of long-term versus short-term 
institutional investor ownership on litigation likelihood documented by Pukthuanthong et al. 
(2017), we expect that closer geographic proximity to the largest long-term (short-term) 
institutional investors will strengthen (weaken) the negative (positive) relationship between long-
term (short-term) institutional stock ownership and the firm’s litigation risk. Thus, our second 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The larger the distance between a firm and its largest long-term (short-
term) institutional investors, the weaker (stronger) the positive (negative) influence of the 
investors’ stock ownership on the firm’s litigation risk. 
The above relationship highlights the impact of geographic proximity on the strength of 
monitoring by institutions as well as the substitutability effect between proximity and equity 
ownership.  
3. Data description 
3.1. Data 
We consider all non-IPO related securities class action lawsuits filed under Section 
10b(5) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act with filing dates between January 1996 and 
December 2007, as listed in Stanford’s SCAC3. We classify lawsuits into nine allegation groups 
based on the lawsuit descriptions provided by Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, 
the Securities Class Action Alert (a monthly newsletter published by Institutional Share 

















Shareholder Services), and the U.S. Department of Justice’s PACER database.4 In addition, we 
classify lawsuits by industry based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification. 
We collect information on institutional holdings and financial statements, as well as 
market data and distance data, for sued firms one quarter prior to their lawsuit filing dates. For 
non-sued firms (i.e., all firms in the Thomson Reuters 13F database other than the sued firms), 
we retrieve market and financial statement information at the end of the same quarter. 
Quarterly institutional stock holdings and related information are collected from 
Thomson Reuters’ Institutional Holdings (13F) database, formerly known as the CDA/Spectrum 
database.5 Financial statement data are collected from the Compustat quarterly files to facilitate 
matching with the quarterly institutional holdings data. Stock price data are collected from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  
Our final sample of sued firms has 1,160 observations with complete information on the 
lawsuit, the institutional investors’ ownership and geographic distance, and all key financial 
statement and market variables. Finally, we include all non-sued firms in the Thomson Reuters 
13F database as a comparison benchmark. 
3.2. Variables 
First, we define a litigation variable, Sued, which is set to one if a firm is sued during the 
sample period and zero otherwise. 




 Every quarter, money managers have to file Form 13F with the SEC, which contains information on the ownership 















Further, in our analysis, we focus our attention on a firm’s five largest institutional 
investors and distinguish between short- and long-term investors.6 For this purpose, we follow 
the procedure used by Chen et al. (2007). Specifically, for each portfolio firm and each quarter 
listed in the Thomson Reuters 13F database, we first identify the five largest institutional 
investors based on their shareholdings, and then categorize those institutional investors as either 
short-term or long-term based on their investment horizon. If an institutional investor is among a 
firm’s five largest institutional investors for at least the last four quarters, it is considered a long-
term investor; if the institutional investor is among the five largest institutional investors for less 
than four quarters, it is considered a short-term investor.  
Next, for each investor type, we construct a measure of geographic distance. More 
specifically, at the end of each quarter, we calculate for each firm and for each investor type the 
equally-weighted average distance between the firm’s headquarters and the given investor type 
using the five largest institutional investors (i.e., LongDist for long-term investors and ShortDist 
for short-term investors). 
In the next step, we aggregate institutional ownership information for each firm and for 
each quarter based on the type of institutional investor. Specifically, we construct two variables: 
LongOwn, which denotes the total ownership by long-term institutions among the largest five 
investors; and ShortOwn, which is the corresponding variable calculated for short-term 
institutions.  
Finally, following previous studies, we control for various variables that might affect a 
firm’s probability of being sued, including firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, 
leverage, accruals, stock return, stock return volatility, exchange listing, as well as industry and 
                                                          
6
 We follow the literature on institutional monitoring, which suggests that only large, long-term institutional 
















year dummy variables. We use the natural log of a firm’s total market capitalization in 1996 
dollars to measure the size of a firm (Firm Size). Larger firms are more likely to be included in 
portfolios of institutional investors, especially when institutional investors have indexed 
portfolios. When there is a large investment in a large firm, institutional investors have a greater 
incentive to monitor and affect the firm’s governance (e.g., Cheng et al., 2010; Gillan and Starks, 
2000). Therefore, the risk of litigation is likely to be alleviated for these firms because of the 
close monitoring by institutional investors. On the other hand, large firms may be more likely to 
be sued by institutional investors than small firms because there is a greater chance that the 
investors will be able to extract a sizeable settlement (Alexander, 1991). The exact sign of this 
variable is thus an empirical question. We use the return on assets (ROA) to control for a firm’s 
profitability. We argue that managers of profitable firms have less incentive to engage in illegal 
activities and thus a lower risk of being sued. Following the literature, we also include a firm’s 
stock return (Stock Return) and book-to-market (Book-to-Market) to measure performance. 
Similar to our ROA measure, we argue that a higher stock return and a lower book-to-market 
ratio indicate superior performance and thus lower firm’s litigation risk. Moreover, we include 
stock return volatility (Volatility) to control for the riskiness of the firm. Furthermore, we include 
financial leverage (Leverage) because firms with higher leverage have been shown to more 
frequently engage in fraud or earnings manipulation to avoid debt covenant violations (Defond 
and Jiambalvo, 1994; Cheng et al., 2010). In addition, we employ accruals (Accrual Ratio) 
because Peng and Röell (2008) show that firms with high accruals are subject to a higher 
probability of litigation. Moreover, we include a dummy variable that identifies exchange listed 
firms (US Listed Dummy) and a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a firm’s auditor is 















will improve a firm’s disclosure quality and discipline management, thus lowering the firm’s 
litigation risk. The extant literature has shown that firms in certain industries may face higher 
litigation risk than firms operating in other sectors. For example, Francis et al. (1994) show that 
technology firms and firms in retail industries are more likely to be sued. To account for these 
findings, we include industry dummy variables (based on two-digit SIC codes) to control for any 
time-invariant, unobservable industry factors. In addition, we include year dummies to control 
for potential differences in litigation activity across years.  
All variables, except the dummy variables, are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5% to 
reduce the impact of outliers. In addition, all dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation. The 
Appendix provides the definition and data source for each of the aforementioned variables.  
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the litigation data and for the main institutional 
and control variables used in this study. For each variable, the table reports the results of a t-test 
comparing our sued and non-sued subsamples. 
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
Panel A of Table 1 provides litigation summary statistics for our sample of 1,160 sued 
firms. Specifically, the panel reports summary statistics for our sued-firm sample by year, by 
industry (based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification), by allegation type, and based on 
whether or not the firm is traded on a major U.S. stock exchange. 
The number of lawsuits per year does not vary much between 1998 and 2005 (mean 118 
and range 96-135, with the largest number of cases occurring in 2002). Comparatively fewer 















more than 32 % of all cases. Chemical firms (Industry 5) have the lowest number of lawsuits, 
being the target of only 1.2 % of all cases during our sample period. The panel also provides 
details on the nature of the primary alleged fraud in each complaint. In our sample, misleading 
and/or false statements (Alleg 1) account for approximately 25 % of all lawsuits, followed by 
failures to disclose existing business problems and misrepresentations about the firm’s financial 
condition (Alleg 3), which account for 16.7 % of all lawsuits. In addition, more than 73% of our 
sample firms are traded on a major U.S. stock exchange. 
In Panel B of Table 1, we provide descriptive statistics for our key institutional variables, 
distance measures, and control variables for our sued and non-sued firm sub-samples. This panel 
also reports results for a series of mean and median equality tests of our variables between the 
sub-samples. These tests reveal significant differences for most of the ownership and distance 
variables between the two sub-samples, providing initial evidence that these variables affect a 
firm’s litigation risk. 
For instance, we find that both the mean and median ownership by long-term institutions 
among the five biggest investors (LongOwn) are significantly higher for non-sued firms than for 
sued firms (significant at the 1% level). In contrast, our short-term ownership measure is 
significantly higher for sued firms than for non-sued firms. This difference between long- and 
short-term ownership suggests that long-term institutional investors have stronger incentives to 
monitor their firms than short-term investors, who instead “vote with their feet.” Our equality 
tests further indicate that the distance variables (LongDist and ShortDist) are significantly higher 
(at the 1% level of significance) for sued firms than for non-sued firms, thus supporting 















In line with our expectations, we also observe that sued firms have a lower book-to-
market ratio and a higher stock return volatility than non-sued firms. In addition, consistent with 
Alexander’s (1991) deep pocket argument, sued firms tend to be larger. 
Panel C of Table 1 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients between all variables in 
our full sample. The correlation matrix suggests a weak and negligible relation between most 
variable pairs, thereby erasing any multicollinearity concerns. 
4. Model specification 
4.1. The effect of distance on litigation risk 
To test Hypothesis 1, we examine how the geographic distance between the largest 
institutional investors and their portfolio firms affects the firms’ litigation risk. We also account 
for potential differences in this effect between investors with short- and long-term investment 
horizons.  
More formally, we construct the following logit regression: 
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 ! + 
+	∑ #$%&'$(  + )*+,,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 + -./,,* +	0	,      (1) 
where Suiti is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i is sued during our sample period and 
zero otherwise. Thus, our dependent variable is defined by the log-odds ratio	ln 23456	789:(3456	789:(;<. 
LongDisti (ShortDisti) is the geographic distance variable estimated as the equally-weighted 
average distance, in hundreds of miles, between a firm and its largest long-term (short-term) 
investors (see Appendix for details). LongOwni (ShortOwni) is the ownership variable estimated 















investors (see Appendix for details). Controls are our control variables chosen based on the 
relevant literature and explained in detail in the Appendix. Following previous studies, we also 
include year and industry dummies. 
4.2. The effect of distance on the institutional ownership-litigation risk relationship 
To test our Hypothesis 2, we examine how geographic distance between the largest 
institutional investors and the firm affects the relationship between institutional stock ownership 
and a firm’s litigation risk. As in the previous analysis, we distinguish between short- and long-
term investors.  
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where all variables, other than the interaction terms, are the same as in equation (1). The 
interaction variables  ! ×   and 
ℎ ! × 
ℎ are the products of 
the corresponding ownership and distance variables outlined in the previous sub-section, and 
reflect the effect of the geographic distance between the largest long-term (short-term) 
institutional investors and the firm on the ownership-litigation risk relationship. 
5. Empirical results 















Table 2 reports the results for the full and reduced versions of our logistic regression 
estimations summarized in equations (1) and (2).  
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
More specifically, Model 1 reports the results for a base case analysis that only includes 
the control variables. Models 2 to 4 include the control variables and ownership variables for 
each investor type separately (Models 2 and 3), and for both investor types simultaneously 
(Model 4). Our results are in line with the findings of Pukthuanthong et al. (2017) indicating that 
larger levels of long-term (short-term) institutional investor ownership decrease (increase) the 
litigation risk of the investee firm.  
Models 5 to 7 include our controls and distance variables for short- and long-term 
investors separately (Models 5 and 6), and for the two investor types together (Model 7). When 
we run our analysis separately for Models 5 and 6, respectively, the distance effect is positive 
and significant for both types of investors, suggesting that the larger the distance between the 
largest institutional investors and the investee firm, the greater the firm’s litigation risk. When 
we conduct our analysis with the distance variables for both investor types included 
simultaneously (Model 7), the coefficient for the short-term investor distance variable remains 
positive, but loses its significance. Therefore, the results for Models 5 to 7 mostly support 
Hypothesis 1 that geographic distance between the largest institutional investors and the firm 
increases a firm’s litigation risk, while the evidence for short-term investors is weaker.  
Model 8 (9) includes the long-term (short-term) ownership and distance variables along 
with the control variables. Model 10 represents the full model as expressed by equation (1). 
Besides the controls, it accounts for the ownership and distance variables of both investor types 















6, and 7. The results reveal that a larger distance between the largest institutional investors and 
the firm is associated with a greater litigation risk for the firm; the evidence is again stronger for 
the long-term institutional investors than for short-term investors.7 
5.2. The effect of distance on the institutional ownership-litigation risk relationship 
Models 11 and 12 of Table 2 reflect the analysis expressed by equation (2), but consider 
each investor type separately. More specifically, Model 11 (12) includes the largest long-term 
(short-term) institutional ownership together with the interaction of this variable with the 
distance between the largest long-term (short-term) institutional investors and the firm. Our 
estimation results for Model 11 show that the larger the distance between the largest long-term 
institutional investors and the firm, the weaker the negative relationship between the stock 
ownership of the largest long-term investors and the investee’s firm litigation risk. Further, the 
results for Model 12 reveal that the larger the distance between the largest short-term 
institutional investors and the firm, the stronger the positive relationship between the institutions’ 
stock ownership and the firm’s litigation risk. These results are supportive of Hypothesis 2. 
When we repeat our analysis but include the ownership variables and interaction terms 
for both types of investors simultaneously (Model 13 in Table 2), the coefficient for the 
interaction variable for the largest short-term institutional investors declines considerably (both 
in its absolute value and compared to the corresponding coefficient for the largest long-term 
institutional investors), and loses its statistical significance.  
To summarize, our results indicate that the geographic distance between a firm and its 
largest long-term institutional investors negatively affects the relationship between the investors’ 
                                                          
7
 In Model 10, the coefficient for the distance between the largest short-term institutional investors and the firm is 
positive, but insignificant. Moreover, it appears to be considerably lower than the coefficient for the largest long-
term institutional investors. However, the difference in the coefficients is statistically insignificant. The respective 















ownership and the firm’s litigation risk, suggesting that geographically-close, long-term 
institutional investors provide better monitoring services to their portfolio firms than their 
geographically distant counterparts. For short-term investors, geographic distance is found to 
have a similar influence, i.e., the positive effect of short-term institutional ownership on 
litigation risk is reduced when the investors are close to the firm. 
6. Robustness tests 
6.1. Endogeneity concerns 
While the ownership by local institutional investors is expected to affect a firm’s 
litigation risk, one must also consider the possibility of reverse causality (i.e., that the investment 
decisions of institutions are influenced by a firm’s exposure to the litigation risk)8. To address 
the potential endogeneity between a firm’s litigation risk and local institutional ownership, we 
conduct a series of robustness checks. Following the literature on geographic distance, we 
employ a two-stage instrumental variables approach. Specifically, we follow Gaspar and Massa 
(2007) and Ayers et al. (2011) and use 25 location dummy variables as instruments representing 
the 25 largest cities in the U.S., plus a remote city dummy. We use these 26 variables as 
exogenous instruments for local and distant institutional ownership. We then use the predicted 
values of the potentially endogenous variable(s) obtained from the first-stage regressions in the 
second-stage regressions. The results for the second-stage regressions are presented in Table 3. If 
there is indeed an endogeneity issue, our previous results may be invalid and the results 
presented in Table 3 should instead be used to draw conclusions. We perform a Wald test to 
                                                          
8
 If reverse causality is also present, the argument that proximity provides information would also play out in the 
opposite direction. In other words, proximity between an institution and its portfolio firm may provide the institution 
with information about the probability of a lawsuit that justifies their very investment or their decision to exit the 















address the question of whether our variables of interest are endogenous or exogeneous. The null 
hypothesis for the test is that there is no endogeneity for the ownership and distance variables. 
The results are shown in the last two rows of Table 3. The p-values for the tests are all above 
10%, implying that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Therefore the need for instrumental 
variables is eliminated and our regular model and regressions can be considered appropriate and 
valid.  
***Insert Table 3 about here*** 
6.2. Other robustness tests  
To further ensure that our results are not driven by our choices regarding sample 
composition and/or variable definition, we perform a number of additional sensitivity checks to 
examine the impact of distance and long-term versus short-term institutional investors’ 
ownership on litigation risk. The results are shown in Panels A and B of Table 4. Specifically, 
Panel A provides robustness checks for Hypothesis 1, while Panel B provides robustness checks 
for Hypothesis 2. 
***Insert Table 4 about here*** 
In Models (1) of Panels A and B, we implement alternative definitions for our distance 
variables, LongDist and ShortDist, by using the number of local short- and long-term investors 
among the five largest institutional investors, respectively, instead of the measure of the average 
geographic distance between the investors and the firm, which we use in our main analysis. In 
these models, institutional investors are defined as local if they are located within a radius of 250 
miles from the firm’s headquarters (e.g., Chhaochharia et al., 2012). Our results in Panel A 















are not significant9. Further, we retest our second hypothesis using the number of local investors 
as the proximity measure. Specifically, we include our ownership variables and the interactions 
of these ownership variables with the number of local investors as the main explanatory 
variables. Model (1) in Panel B presents the results. As expected, the coefficient of the 
interaction term between short-term ownership and our alternative distance measure is negative 
(-0.419) and significant at the 5% level, which means that the larger the number of local short-
term investors, the weaker the positive effect of their ownership on a firm’s litigation risk. This 
result corroborates the findings of our main analysis and supports Hypothesis 2. The coefficient 
of the interaction of long-term ownership and the number of local long-term institutional 
investors is negative (-0.434) and significant at the 10% level, indicating that greater 
representation of local long-term institutional investors strengthens the negative effect of their 
ownership on a firm’s litigation risk.  
In another robustness check, we examine the impact of the geographic distance between 
the firm and its largest investor on the firm’s litigation risk.10 Models (2)-(3) in Panel A provide 
the results where the largest institutional investor is a long-term (short-term) investor, 
respectively. The results for Model (2) indicate neither an economically nor statistically 
significant relationship between the proximity of the firm to its largest institutional investor and 
the firm’s litigation risk. Thus, we do not observe that geographic closeness of the largest 
institutional investor to the firm reduces a firm’s litigation risk when the institution has a long-
term orientation. At the same time, as shown by Model (3) in Panel A, the coefficient for the 
                                                          
9
 In this robustness test, the sign of the coefficient for our distance measure (estimated as the number of local 
investors) is negative. This is opposite to the positive sign reported for the distance variable in our main analysis. 
These results are consistent; however, since in the main analysis we use the average distance as the distance 
measure. 
10
 This analysis accounts for prior studies documenting the role of a single large shareholder (e.g., Admati et al., 















distance between the largest short-term investor and the firm is positive and statistically 
significant. In other words, when the largest investor has a short-term horizon, the closer this 
investor is located to the firm, the lower the firm’s litigation risk. This finding is in line with our 
main results and support Hypothesis 1.  
Next, we reexamine Hypothesis 2 for the largest institutional investor alone. Specifically, 
we examine how geographic distance affects the relationship between the stock ownership of this 
largest investor and the firm’s litigation risk, for cases in which the largest investor is a long-
term (Model 2, Panel B) or a short-term investor (Model 3, Panel B). The results show that the 
coefficient of the interaction term between ownership and distance for both the largest short- and 
long-term institutional investor is highly significantly and positive. For the case where the largest 
institutional investor is a long-term investor, this implies that as the distance between the largest 
long-term investor and the firm increases, the litigation risk-reducing effect of his/her ownership 
becomes weaker. For the case in which the largest institutional investor is a short-term investor, 
our findings reveal that a larger distance between this investor and the firm strengthens the 
positive effect of the investor’s ownership on the firm’s litigation risk. These findings also 
support Hypothesis 2. 
The extant literature typically defines blockholders as shareholders who own at least 5% 
of a firm’s total outstanding equity. Blockholders have high voting power and a strong incentive 
to monitor firms and thus may have a significant impact on a firm’s decision-making. In Model 
(4) of Table 4 (Panels A-B), we perform robustness tests in which we replace the group of the 
five largest institutional investors with blockholders and examine the impact of the blockholders’ 
distance on the firm’s litigation risk. The results displayed in Panels A-B of Table 4 are 















Table 2. Thus, our conclusions remain unchanged when we use this alternative definition of 
influential investors.  
In Model (5) of Table 4 (Panels A-B), we examine whether our results continue to hold 
when we control for changes in ownership in addition to ownership levels of the largest 
institutional investors. Qualitatively, the results of this robustness test do not differ from the 
results of our main analysis given in Table 2. 
Finally, following the extant literature, we exclude financial firms from our full sample 
and repeat our logistic regression estimation to ensure that the potentially skewed data for 
financial firms does not drive our results. Model (7) in Table 4 (Panels A-B) present our results 
excluding financial firms. The results are consistent with the findings documented for our base-
case analysis employing the full sample which are reported in Table 2.  
7. Conclusion 
To the best of our knowledge, empirical research that investigates the effect of 
geographic distance on the risk of corporate litigation is non-existent. Our study attempts to add 
to the body of knowledge by examining the link between the geographic proximity of 
institutional investors to their portfolio firms and the litigation risk of those firms. Using a 
comprehensive sample of shareholder class action lawsuits, we show that when institutions are 
located in closer proximity to a firm’s headquarters, the firm’s probability of being sued is 
significantly lower. Moreover, we find that geographic proximity affects the relationship 
between institutional investors’ ownership and the litigation risk of their portfolio firms that has 
been documented in prior studies. In particular, geographic closeness between a firm and its 
largest long-term institutional investors strengthens the negative effect of long-term institutional 















investors and the firm weakens the positive effect of short-term ownership on litigation risk. In 
other words, long-term institutional ownership decreases litigation risk even more when the 
respective investors are close to the firm, while short-term institutional ownership increases 
litigation risk less when the investors are close to the firm. 
We surmise that the aforementioned distance effects arise due to more efficient 
monitoring of a firm’s management through easier and more frequent private communications. 
Physical proximity to a firm’s headquarters allows institutional holders to curb managerial 
misconduct ex ante and thus avoid the potential damages caused by litigation. The effect is 
particularly acute for large investors with a long-term commitment to their investments. Our 
results are robust to potential endogeneity of the regressors in our empirical model, and continue 
to hold after taking into account different measurement methods and alternative econometric 
specifications. Our study has broad implications for academics, policy makers, and practitioners 
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Table 1  
Summary statistics 
 










Lawsuit distribution by 
exchange listing status 
Year N FF industry 
class N Allegation N Type N 
1996 47 Industry 1 49 Alleg 1 427 Exchange 855 
1997 89 Industry 2 26 Alleg 2 271 Non-exchange 305 
1998 127 Industry 3 66 Alleg 3 291 
  
1999 119 Industry 4 16 Alleg 4 258 
  
2000 116 Industry 5 14 Alleg 5 257 
  
2001 104 Industry 6 380 Alleg 6 36 
  
2002 135 Industry 7 53 Alleg 7 139 
  
2003 120 Industry 8 31 Alleg 8 17 
  
2004 129 Industry 9 108 Alleg 9 38 
  
2005 96 Industry 10 183 
    
2006 61 Industry 11 100 
    
2007 17 Industry 12 134 
    















Panel B: Mean and median equality tests between the two sub-samples 
 
Sued firms     Non-sued firms     t-test Wilcoxon test 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Lower Quartile Median 
Upper 









LongDist 902 11.717 7.814 5.353 11.238 16.510 32700 10.932 6.772 5.759 10.444 14.546 0.001*** 0.021** 
ShortDist 1142 11.718 6.885 6.422 11.364 16.662 36713 10.888 6.879 5.442 10.236 14.806 0.001*** 0.001*** 
LongOwn 1160 0.103 0.099 0.018 0.085 0.160 38869 0.114 0.112 0.020 0.088 0.176 0.001*** 0.004*** 
ShortOwn 1160 0.124 0.085 0.061 0.108 0.173 38869 0.087 0.082 0.022 0.066 0.129 0.001*** 0.001*** 
Firm Size 1160 6.371 2.008 4.977 6.164 7.683 38869 4.938 1.892 3.564 4.833 6.206 0.001*** 0.001*** 
ROA 1160 -0.033 0.097 -0.045 0.000 0.013 38869 -0.014 0.079 -0.011 0.006 0.019 0.001*** 0.001*** 
Book-to-Market 1160 0.542 0.795 0.196 0.394 0.694 38869 0.701 0.826 0.288 0.521 0.872 0.001*** 0.001*** 
Leverage 1160 0.233 0.243 0.010 0.179 0.377 38869 0.215 0.218 0.020 0.166 0.341 0.006*** 0.185 
Accrual Ratio 1160 -0.026 0.111 -0.071 -0.020 0.014 38869 -0.012 0.125 -0.070 -0.024 0.018 0.001*** 0.588 
Stock Return 1160 0.014 0.888 -0.525 -0.173 0.223 38869 0.129 0.708 -0.272 0.024 0.336 0.001*** 0.001*** 
Volatility 1160 0.199 0.120 0.117 0.176 0.250 38869 0.160 0.111 0.086 0.132 0.199 0.001*** 0.001*** 
US Listed Dummy 1160 0.737 0.440 0.000 1.000 1.000 38869 0.773 0.419 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.001*** 0.004*** 
Big 4 Dummy 1160 0.203 0.403 0.000 0.000 0.000 38869 0.069 0.253 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004*** 0.001*** 


















Panel C: Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Sued (1) 1.00   
LongDist (2) 0.02 1.00    
ShortDist (3) 0.01 0.41 1.00   
LongOwn (4) -0.01 0.00 0.03 1.00 
ShortOwn (5) 0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.02 1.00 
Firm Size (6) 0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.22 0.28 1.00 
ROA (7) -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.13 0.10 0.27 1.00 
Book-to-Market (8) -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.08 -0.05 -0.29 0.06 1.00 
Leverage (9) 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 1.00 
Accrual Ratio (10) -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.11 -0.08 -0.19 -0.29 -0.04 -0.03 1.00 
Stock Return (11) -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.21 0.17 -0.22 -0.07 -0.06 1.00 
Volatility (12) 0.05 0.09 0.09 -0.21 -0.06 -0.33 -0.36 -0.01 0.00 0.20 0.12 1.00 
US Listed Dummy (13) -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.15 0.14 0.36 0.24 -0.05 -0.12 -0.17 0.11 -0.23 1.00 
Big 4 Dummy (14) 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.11 0.00 -0.01 0.04 1.00 
    
 
           
 
Note: In Panel A, we report distributional information for our sample of 1,160 non-IPO related securities class action cases filed under Section 10b(5) of the 
1934 Securities Exchange Act between January 1996 and December 2007. The Fama-French (FF) 12 industry classification is based on Kenneth French’s 
identification. Lawsuits are classified based on the alleged securities law violations: Alleg 1 (misleading or false statements), Alleg 2 (failure to disclose 
material adverse information), Alleg 3 (failure to disclose existing business problems, misrepresentations about financial condition), Alleg 4 (artificially 
inflated financial results or revenues, requiring restatement), Alleg 5 (improper accounting and sales practices, violations of GAAP), Alleg 6 (fraudulent 
transactions), Alleg 7 (insider trading), Alleg 8 (tainted research, including inflated analyst recommendations, misleading research reports), and Alleg 9 (other 
types or missing information). Several of our sample firms are sued for multiple security law violations. In Panel B, we provide summary statistics for our 
sued versus non-sued firms and report the mean, median, lower and upper quartile, as well as the standard deviation for each of our main institutional, 
distance, and control variables. The control group consists of 38,869 non-sued firm-year observations with full information on our key variables. In Panel C, 
we report the Pearson correlation coefficients between all pairs of variables for our full sample. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are provided in 
























(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13) 
Long-term 
Institutional Investors  
 
  






LongDist       0.010***  0.009**  0.010***  0.009**     
 
      (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.017)     
LongOwn 
  -1.475***  -0.571**      -0.940***  -0.476  -1.994***  -1.420** 
 
  (0.000)  (0.032)      (0.007)  (0.210)  (0.000)  (0.016) 
LongOwn×LongDist 
     
 
   
 
    0.091***  0.080*** 
 





   
 
   
 
   
 
   
ShortDist 
     
 
 0.010** 0.002   0.009* 0.001     
 
       (0.029) (0.705)   (0.062) (0.909)     
ShortOwn 
   3.479*** 3.293***       3.346*** 4.200***   2.632*** 3.862*** 
 
   (0.000) (0.000)       (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
ShortOwn×ShortDist 
     
 
   
 
     0.062*** 0.028 
 




   
 
   
 




Firm Size 0.660***  0.666*** 0.657*** 0.659***  0.695*** 0.654*** 0.691***  0.698*** 0.652*** 0.697***  0.698*** 0.652*** 0.697*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -1.620***  -1.574*** -1.897*** -1.863***  -1.524*** -1.583*** -1.500***  -1.484*** -1.864*** -1.809***  -1.490*** -1.866*** -1.808*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Book-to-Market 0.113*  0.125** 0.1 0.105*  0.099 0.107* 0.088  0.106 0.093 0.081  0.107 0.092 0.082 
 
(0.065)  (0.037) (0.114) (0.093)  (0.134) (0.086) (0.190)  (0.103) (0.149) (0.251)  (0.100) (0.152) (0.245) 
Leverage 0.581**  0.624** 0.536** 0.555**  0.722*** 0.578** 0.687***  0.746*** 0.529** 0.636***  0.763*** 0.531** 0.658*** 
 
(0.018)  (0.011) (0.027) (0.022)  (0.002) (0.017) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.028) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.028) (0.005) 
Accrual Ratio -0.432*  -0.469** -0.354 -0.374  -0.427* -0.447* -0.425  -0.454* -0.365 -0.328  -0.445* -0.36 -0.318 
 
(0.062)  (0.039) (0.147) (0.123)  (0.094) (0.066) (0.110)  (0.072) (0.149) (0.279)  (0.079) (0.156) (0.292) 
Stock Return -0.657***  -0.649*** -0.639*** -0.637***  -0.866*** -0.658*** -0.874***  -0.864*** -0.641*** -0.851***  -0.862*** -0.639*** -0.848*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility 5.284***  5.062*** 5.202*** 5.120***  5.841*** 5.208*** 5.829***  5.715*** 5.151*** 5.885***  5.724*** 5.151*** 5.875*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
















(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Big 4 Dummy 1.226***  1.233*** 1.204*** 1.208***  1.210*** 1.221*** 1.207***  1.212*** 1.202*** 1.191***  1.215*** 1.203*** 1.194*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -7.060***  -6.874*** -7.366*** -7.267***  -6.957*** -7.081*** -6.888***  -6.817*** -7.378*** -7.124***  -6.671*** -7.282*** -6.980*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 










N 39,347  39,347 39,347 39,347  33,152 37,352 31,157  33,152 37,352 31,157  33,152 37,352 31,157 
Pseudo R2 0.187  0.189 0.196 0.196  0.206 0.186 0.204  0.207 0.194 0.213  0.207 0.194 0.214 
 
Note: Litigation risk logit results are presented for our whole sample over the period from January 1996 to December 2007. Our sample includes 1,160 
companies that were sued under Section 10b (5) of the 1934 Securities Act out of which 902 firms have complete accounting, market, institutional ownership, 
and distance data available. All other firms that comprise this sample were not subject to a securities class action litigation during our sample period. Detailed 
descriptions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. For each regressor, we present both the coefficient estimate and p-value in parentheses. Standard 



































Table 3  
Robustness checks: Controlling for endogeneity  
 
 
Second-stage regression results         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Long-term  
Institutional Investors   
 
 
    
LongDist 
 -0.007 -0.007      
 
 (0.446) (0.430)      
LongOwn 0.596  -0.487*** -0.052     
 
(0.829)  (0.006) (0.942)     
LongOwn×LongDist 
   -0.045     
 
   (0.492)     
Short-term  
Institutional Investors 
        
ShortDist 
     -0.005 -0.007  
 
     (0.404) (0.378)  
ShortOwn 
    -1.65  1.912 2.019*** 
 
    (0.683)  (0.695) (0.006) 
ShortOwn×ShortDist 
       -0.039 
 
       (0.543) 
Control Variables         
Firm Size 0.272*** 0.312*** 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.317*** 0.341*** 0.282*** 0.297*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.924*** -0.785*** -0.763*** -0.751*** -0.922*** -0.545** -1.058*** -0.936*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) 
Book-to-Market 0.003 0.045* 0.050** 0.051** 0.025 0.064*** 0.008 0.035 
 
(0.947) (0.055) (0.033) (0.029) (0.303) (0.002) (0.716) (0.109) 
Leverage 0.065 0.305*** 0.319*** 0.317*** 0.078 0.220*** 0.058 0.216*** 
 
(0.566) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.218) (0.001) (0.381) (0.004) 
Accrual Ratio -0.197 -0.274** -0.286** -0.288** -0.191* -0.212** -0.182 -0.229* 
 
(0.143) (0.049) (0.039) (0.038) (0.088) (0.048) (0.117) (0.059) 
Stock Return -0.282*** -0.352*** -0.351*** -0.351*** -0.287*** -0.251*** -0.288*** -0.281*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility 2.793*** 2.856*** 2.788*** 2.779*** 2.850*** 2.438*** 2.701*** 2.544*** 
 















US Listed Dummy -0.373*** -0.388*** -0.382*** -0.383*** -0.343*** -0.269*** -0.393*** -0.417*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Big 4 Dummy 0.572*** 0.550*** 0.552*** 0.551*** 0.568*** 0.493*** 0.573*** 0.564*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 39,637 33,030 33,030 33,030 39,637 37,612 37,612 37,207 
Wald test (χ2 test statistic) 
Null hypothesis: no endogeneity 
0.27 1.79 1.90 1.92 0.65 2.71 2.88 1.28 
Prob > χ2 0.6057 0.1811 0.1697 0.1661 0.4193 0.1001 0.2374 0.2583 
 
Note: This table presents the second-stage results for a series of instrumental variable regressions and tests of endogeneity. The dependent variable in the second 
stage is the binary variable Sued, while the ownership and distance variables are the predicted values from the first stage. Following the existing literature on 
geographic distance (Gaspar and Massa, 2007; Ayers et al., 2011), we construct dummies for the 25 largest cities in the U.S., according to the most recent data 
reported by the U.S. Census Bureau population survey from 2010 and a dummy variable for “remote” cities, defined as those that are located more than 250 
miles away from the major cities based on the U.S. Census Bureau report. p-values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. 
Year and industry fixed effects are included. The last two rows show the results of Wald endogeneity tests for the null hypothesis that our main regressors are 

















Robustness checks: Accounting for alternative variable definitions and sample compositions 
 
Panel A: Robustness checks for Hypothesis 1 (with distance as the main explanatory variable) 
 
 















 Long-term Short-term     
 
(1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Long-term 
Institutional Investors  
 
   
 
   
 
 
LongDist -0.038  -0.002   0.009**  0.008**  0.009***  
 
(0.463)  (0.561)   (0.011)  (0.027)  (0.007)  
LongOwn -0.538*  -1.420***   -0.297  -1.131**  -0.405  
 
(0.068)  (0.003)   (0.372)  (0.011)  (0.324)  
LongOwnChange        -0.534    
 
       (0.304)    
Short-term 
Institutional Investors 
           
ShortDist -0.019   0.010**  0.001  -0.000  0.005  
 
(0.580)   (0.016)  (0.813)  (0.975)  (0.486)  
ShortOwn 3.273***   1.484**  3.054***  5.746***  4.134***  
 
(0.000)   (0.025)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
ShortOwnChange        -2.889***    
 
       (0.000)    
Control Variables            
Firm Size 0.661***  0.663*** 0.661***  0.703***  0.698***  0.660***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
ROA -1.868***  -1.612*** -1.637***  -1.643***  -1.792***  -1.671***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Book-to-Market 0.105*  0.118* 0.115**  0.087  0.070  0.070  
 
(0.095)  (0.052) (0.029)  (0.207)  (0.319)  (0.308)  
Leverage 0.559**  0.606** 0.593***  0.654***  0.627***  0.591***  
 
(0.021)  (0.013) (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)  
















(0.136)  (0.048) (0.045)  (0.162)  (0.354)  (0.079)  
Stock Return -0.638***  -0.654*** -0.651***  -0.858***  -0.844***  -0.787***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Volatility 5.116***  5.192*** 5.160***  5.885***  5.805***  5.557***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
US Listed D. -0.910***  -0.840*** -0.854***  -0.876***  -0.921***  -0.860***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Big 4 Dummy 1.206***  1.228*** 1.221***  1.199***  1.184***  1.090***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Constant -7.229***  -6.957*** -7.146***  -7.008***  0.698***  -6.955***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Year and Industry FE Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
           
Observations 39,347  39,347 39,347  31,157  31,157  28,523  
















 Largest shareholder  Block 
holders 






 Long-term Short-term     
 
(1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Long-term 
Institutional Investors            
LongOwn -0.34  -2.726***   -1.470**  -2.066***  -1.553**  
 
(0.308)  (0.000)   (0.011)  (0.001)  (0.015)  
LongOwn×LongDist -0.434*  0.108**   0.100***  0.079***  0.095***  
 
(0.092)  (0.014)   (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.001)  
LongOwnChange        -0.53    
 
















Institutional Investors            
ShortOwn 3.619***   1.047  2.924***  5.469***  3.608***  
 
(0.000)   (0.192)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
ShortOwn×ShortDist -0.419**   0.108**  0.01  0.022  0.044  
 
(0.027)   (0.033)  (0.832)  (0.493)  (0.205)  
ShortOwnChange        -2.889***    
 
       (0.000)    
Control Variables            
Firm Size 0.662***  0.661*** 0.661***  0.703***  0.699***  0.660***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
ROA -1.876***  -1.607*** -1.658***  -1.653***  -1.789***  -1.672***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Book-to-Market 0.104*  0.118** 0.112**  0.088  0.071  0.071  
 
(0.100)  (0.026) (0.032)  (0.208)  (0.311)  (0.304)  
Leverage 0.568**  0.624*** 0.584***  0.669***  0.649***  0.608***  
 
(0.019)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  
Accrual Ratio -0.352  -0.457** -0.438*  -0.382  -0.279  -0.502*  
 
(0.150)  (0.041) (0.053)  (0.173)  (0.367)  (0.083)  
Stock Return -0.637***  -0.653*** -0.651***  -0.855***  -0.842***  -0.784***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Volatility 5.124***  5.174*** 5.216***  5.897***  5.790***  5.548***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
US Listed D. -0.915***  -0.838*** -0.861***  -0.875***  -0.923***  -0.864***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Big 4 Dummy 1.206***  1.228*** 1.221***  1.204***  1.186***  1.094***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Constant 0.662***  0.661*** 0.661***  -6.853***  -7.028***  -6.751***  
 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Year and Industry FE Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
           
Observations 39,347  39,347 39,347  31,157  31,157  28,523  
Pseudo R2 0.197  0.189 0.189  0.209  0.217  0.194  
 
Note: This table presents the results for a series of additional robustness tests in which we examine the sensitivity of our results to variations in variable 















term) investors among the top five. In Models (2)-(3), we consider the single largest institutional investor and differentiate between the cases in which the largest 
shareholder has a long- versus short-term investment horizon. In Model (4), we consider long-term (short-term) blockholders. In Model (5), we add a variable 
that captures the change in institutional ownership. More specifically, we explore how changes in ownership levels over a one year horizon among the top five 
institutional investors affect subsequent litigation risk. Finally, in Model (6), we perform a sensitivity check on a subsample that excludes all financial firms. In 
Panel A, we use our distance variables as the main regressors for each of the robustness tests. In Panel B, we use the interaction of these distance measures with 
the ownership variables. p-values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 















Appendix. Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable  Definition Data source 
Main variable of interest  






Geographic distance variables1  
LongDist 
 
1) Average distance between the firm and the largest long-term 
investors. This variable is estimated as the equally weighted average 
distance, in hundreds of miles, between a firm and its largest long-term 
investors (taken from the set of the five largest investors of any type, 
but including in the distance calculation only those investors for whom 
location data were available). 
2) In our robustness tests (Model 1, Panels A and B, Table 4): Number 
of local long-term investors. This variable is estimated as the number 
of long-term investors (among the five largest institutional investors) 
located within 250 miles of a firm. 
Thomson Reuters 13F 
ShortDist 
 
1) Average distance between the firm and the largest short-term 
investors. This variable is estimated as the equally weighted average 
distance, in hundreds of miles, between a firm and its largest short-term 
investors (taken from the set of the five largest investors of any type, 
but including in the distance calculation only those investors for whom 
location data were available). 
2) In our robustness tests (Model 1, Panels A and B, Table 4): Number 
of local short-term investors. This variable is estimated as the number 
of short-term investors (among the five largest institutional investors) 
located within 250 miles of a firm. 
Thomson Reuters 13F 
Ownership variables  
LongOwn 
 
1) Ownership of the largest long-term investors, estimated as the total 
ownership by long-term institutions among the five largest institutional 
investors. 
2) In our robustness tests (Table 4, Panels A and B): a) For Model (2) 
the ownership by the largest institutional investor if the investor is a 
long-term investor; b) For Model (4) the total ownership by long-term 
institutions among the firm’s block holders.  
Thomson Reuters 13F 
ShortOwn 1) Ownership of the largest short-term investors, estimated as the total 
ownership by short-term institutions among the five largest institutional 
Thomson Reuters 13F 
                                                          
1
 For all variables in this group (the geographic distance variables) that use distance, the distance measures are 
calculated based on the geographic coordinates (retrieved using the postal (ZIP) codes) of the corresponding 
firm/investor. Formally, the specific distance between a firm and its investor is computed as follows:  
   Distance	, = r × arccossinlat	 × sinlat + coslat	 × cos	lat × cos	lon	 − lon , where f and i denote 
accordingly the firm and the investor, lat is the latitude, and lon is the longitude, both measured in radians, and r is 
















2) In our robustness tests (Table 4, Panels A and B): a) For Model (3) 
the ownership by the largest institutional investor if the investor is a 
short-term investor; b) For Model (4) the total ownership by short-term 
institutions among the firm’s block holders. 
LongOwnChange 
 
Change in ownership by the largest long-term investors: Percentage 
change in the total ownership of long-term institutional investors 
among the five largest institutional investors. 
Thomson Reuters 13F 
ShortOwnChange 
 
Change in ownership by the largest short-term investors: Percentage 
change in the total ownership of short-term institutional investors 
among the five largest institutional investors. 
Thomson Reuters 13F 
Control variables 
 
Firm Size Natural log of the firm’s market capitalization at the end of the last 
fiscal year prior to the lawsuit (in 1996 dollars). 
Compustat, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) 
ROA Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the book value of total 
assets. 
Compustat 
Book-to-Market Ratio of the book value of equity per share to the firm’s stock price. Compustat 
Leverage Ratio of the long term debt to the book value of total assets. Compustat 
Accrual Ratio Ratio of the income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from 
operations to the book value of total assets.  
Compustat 
Stock Return Average of daily stock returns during a one-year window ending one 
quarter prior to the lawsuit filing quarter. 
CRSP 
Volatility Standard deviation of daily stock returns during a one-year window 




Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed on a major U.S. stock 
exchange. 
Compustat 





Dummy variables based on 2-digit Standard Industry Classification 
(SIC) codes. 
Compustat 
















•        We study the effect of institutional investors-to-firm distance on litigation risk. 
  
•        Institutional investor-to-firm proximity reduces a firm’s litigation risk. 
  
•        The proximity of long-term investors amplifies the ownership-litigation risk relation. 
  
•        The proximity of short-term investors weakens the ownership-litigation risk relation. 
 
